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DEATH OF A CORPS BY A THOUSAND TASKINGS

BY

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ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Robert D. Nossow
TITLE: Death of a Corps by a Thousand Taskings
FORMAT: Strategy Research Project
DATE: 11 April 2000 PAGES: 28 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

As the Army moves into the 21st century, it faces numerous challenges. The events of the past decade have irrevocably changed the way the Army does business. We have moved from a large threat-based Army to a small capabilities-based force. We are now a force-projection Army, formerly a forward-deployed force. The Army needs new tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities; revised, flexible force structure; austere fiscal management; and new war-fighting and peacekeeping capabilities to meet current guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).

To meet today's full spectrum of mission requirements, the Army must maintain a broad range of capabilities to support US joint commands and alliances around the world. The Army must maintain the flexibility to adapt its structure and internal systems and subsystems to respond to changes in national and military strategy. Taking into account our national interests and strategy, the Army must plan and field a flexible capabilities-designed force, able to quickly task-organize and rapidly adjust to a wide variety of new complex missions.

The time is right for change in view of the CSA's bold new initiatives. But there is little time to establish essential cohesion for unit level readiness to conduct the full spectrum of warfare.

This study examines the current Army policy of replacement with individual augmentees (individual tasking, temporary change of station (TCS) or temporary duty/temporary additional duty TDY/TAD)) versus unit replacement, and how this policy is impacting readiness. The Army must establish a policy of unit replacement, rather than overly relying on individual augmentees. The current policy of individual replacement to support numerous requirements is destroying unit readiness and causing extreme personnel turbulence.

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THE DEATH OF A CORPS BY A THOUSAND TASKINGS

As the Army moves into the 21st century, it faces a myriad of challenges. The events of the past decade have irrevocably changed the way the Army does business. We have moved from a large threat-based Army to a small capabilities-based force. We are now a force-projection Army, whereas before we were a forward-deployed force. The Army needs new tactical, operational, and strategic capabilities; revised, flexible force structure; austere fiscal management; and new war-fighting and peacekeeping capabilities to meet current guidance from the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA).

To meet today's full spectrum of mission requirements, the Army must maintain a broad range of capabilities to support U.S. joint commands and alliances around the world. The Army must maintain the flexibility to adapt its structure and internal systems and subsystems to respond to changes in national and military strategy. Taking into account national interests and strategy, the Army must plan and field a flexible capabilities-designed force, able to task-organize and rapidly adjust to a wide variety of new complex missions. Specifically, to meet current strategic goals, the Army, in cooperation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), must change its reliance on the individual augmentee system (individual tasking, temporary change of station [TCS] or temporary duty/temporary additional duty [TDY/TAD]) to utilization of unit replacements. This change will facilitate the development of cohesive units that can successfully carry out the full spectrum of operations.

The time is right for change in view of the CSA's bold new initiatives. However, there is little time to establish essential cohesion for unit level readiness to conduct the full spectrum of warfare.

This study examines the historic similarities between today's Army and the Armies of 1950 and 1964, current Army personnel practice, and the CSA Vision. It describes attributes and characteristics of cohesive units, and shows how current combatant commander (CINC) taskings for individual augmentees breaks down unit cohesion. It identifies the failure of the Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) to fulfill its responsibility in the process and reviews the current allocation of critical leaders. In short, the current policy of individual replacement in support of many requirements is destroying unit readiness and causing extreme personnel turbulence. Some changes must be made. Otherwise, the CSA's vision for the Army will have to be modified to support the CINCs.

BACKGROUND

1950 VS 1999

In 1950, the US Army had ten divisions (four in Japan, one in Germany, and five in the Continental United States [CONUS]). There were 593,000 soldiers on active duty. The occupation forces in Japan focused on nation-building. The peacetime economy of 1950 forced the Army to downsize. The Army of 1950 was having its share of problems: nine of ten divisions were far under-strength; infantry regiments fielded only two of three battalions; organic armor was lacking; maintenance personnel were in critically

short supply; available weapons were leftovers from World War II.¹ The Battle of Osan was the first engagement of the Korean War involving American troops. With the mission of delaying a large attacking enemy force, the U.S. unit Task Force Smith, was assigned two under-strength rifle companies, part of a battalion headquarters company, two recoilless rifle crews, and two 4.2-inch mortar crews--in all about 400 men. The delaying action at Osan revealed many weaknesses in equipment and personnel of the American Occupation Army of Japan in 1950.²

The U.S. Army of 1999 has ten divisions (four outside continental United States [OCONUS] and six in continental United States [CONUS]) and 480,000 soldiers on active duty. The Army has recently focused on nation-building and peacekeeping operations. The fall of the Iron Curtain, the end to the Cold War, the break-up of the Soviet Union/Warsaw Pact, and the anticipated "peace dividend" have encouraged our leaders to downsize the Army. Yet the Army's global missions have increased. The Army is currently suffering from the effects of high operating tempo (OPTEMPO), which is draining personnel strength and morale. Collective training is severely hampered. In one division 22 of 44 howitzers are fully manned. In one brigade of another division 16 of 116 M1A1 tank crews are qualified; their weapons are worn leftovers from the Cold War.³

1964 VS1999

In 1961, the Army began a major transition that was designed to improve mobility, flexibility, and combat staying power. Army leaders began to repair the damage to the Army's capability and morale resulting from a long period of neglect under President Dwight D. Eisenhower.⁴

Despite all of this activity, then CSA General Harold K. Johnson admitted, "that the Army was uncertain about where it was going...was uncertain about its role". He attributed this confusion and uncertainty to the effects of parochialism: the fact that "there tended to be a lot of diverse groups...each pushing for its own ends, but no one pushing for what I would term the good, the benefit of the Army as a whole."⁵ By 1964, General Johnson declared the Army had reached a point "where its many missions scattered it throughout the world, where it could not be stretched much further." But then it was stretched further. The momentous decision to deploy forces to Vietnam placed the Army on the threshold of one of its most challenging missions since World War II.⁶ Using the draft, but no mobilization, the Army then ramped up from 11 to 16 divisions to meet its new commitments. In comparison, today's Army is attempting to respond to increasing mission requirements of peacekeeping operations without a draft, with a steady-state Army, attempting to maintain its strength through random call-ups of the Army National Guard (ANG).⁷

In the spring of 1965, before large-scale deployments to Vietnam began, half of the Army's 16 divisions were in the continental United States. Of the remaining eight, five were in Europe; two were in Korea, and one in Hawaii. Then there were substantial deployments to the Dominican Republic and to

South Vietnam. Over half of the 100,000 men deployed served as advisors in Vietnam.⁸ At the end of 1964 the Army strength had been about 965,000. Two and a half years later it was 1,442,000, and by mid-1968 it was over 1,527,000. Currently, the U.S. Army's active duty authorized strength is 480,000.

In the mid-60's, the Vietnam build-up contributed greatly to reduced readiness worldwide, draining away experienced and capable soldiers. As early as the autumn of 1964, CSA General Creighton W. Abrams reported the adverse impact of the requirements for advisors to the South Vietnamese Army. In Vietnam, the Army had already committed the equivalent of nearly three and one-half divisions of captains and majors, about three and one-half divisions of lieutenants, and about three and one-half divisions of master sergeants. None of these leaders were assigned to table(s) of organization and equipment (TO&E) units. There was no provision in the Army's manning policies for these requirements. The soldiers had to be taken out of existing units, leaving the vacated leadership tasks there to be picked up by those who had been followers.⁹ The active duty Army of 1999 cannot afford to have valuable leadership serving in positions other than its TO&E units. We must not repeat the mistakes of 1964. Leadership is critical to unit cohesion.

Army readiness was a major concern in 1964—not just the state of readiness, but even the Army's ability to measure and accurately report readiness in a timely manner. With the system then in use, the Army simply was not able to relate a given level of resources to a resultant level of readiness. This meant, among other things, that it was unable to demonstrate to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) what effect various budget levels would actually have on readiness.¹⁰ The nation simply cannot afford a repeat of such a quandary regarding national security.

CURRENT SITUATION

During the past decade, the active Army will have declined from a military strength of 781,000 to 480,000—a 38 percent decrease. During the same period the National Guard has faced a 23 percent reduction in end strength from 457,000 to 329,000. The Army Reserve has reduced its end strength by 36 percent from 319,000 to 201,000.¹¹

Despite this downsizing and decrease in strength, Congress has not relieved the military of any of its Title 10 requirements. Nor have the Title 10 requirements changed. The size of the Army continues to decrease while the mission load continues to increase. Title 10, United States Code (USC), Section 3062 states:

It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other Armed Forces, of preserving the peace and security...of the United States...supporting the national objectives... and overcoming any nations responsible for aggressive acts that imperil the peace and security of the United States. [The Army] shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land...[and] is responsible for preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated... mobilization plans for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the

needs of war.¹²

On 12 October 1999, CSA General Eric K. Shinseki shared his vision of the Army: " Soldiers on point for the nation [are] transforming this, the most respected Army in the world, into a strategically responsive force that is dominant across the full spectrum of operations." This guidance means the Army must move away from individual augmentees to unit deployments, regardless of the size of the unit. It must return to giving mission-type orders to units and then allow tasked units to execute the mission within the stated guidance. In 1980, General Edward C. Meyer, CSA, indicated that the most modern equipment in the world is useless without motivated individuals drilled into cohesive units with sound leadership at all levels.¹³ We must determine the optimal size unit for a given mission and insure the unit package is deployed that way. Units need to train as force-packaged units. They must be prepared to move quickly from peacekeeping to peace enforcement to open conflict in a rapidly changing environment.

The Army must maintain strategic dominance across the entire spectrum of operations. "The spectrum of likely operations describes a need for land forces in joint, combined, and multi-national formations for a variety of missions extending from humanitarian assistance disaster relief to peacekeeping and peacemaking to major theater wars, including conflicts involving the potential use of weapons of mass destruction." The key to achieving this vision is fielding a responsive, deployable, agile, versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable force. The definition of "agile" specifies that the Army must "attain the mental and physical agility operationally to move forces from stability and support operations to warfighting and back again." Likewise, the requirement for versatility means that we "design into our organizational structure forces which will, with minimal adjustment and in minimum time, generate formations which can dominate at any point on the spectrum of operations."¹⁴

The "Army Vision Statement" is skillfully integrated into the concepts of Field Manual (FM) 100-5 Operations, the "Army's keystone warfighting doctrine." This document provides guidance for the conduct of campaigns, major operations, battles, engagements, operations other than war, force-projection, total army, active and reserve, and military civilians. Additionally it is the "authoritative foundation for subordinate doctrine, force design, materiel acquisition, professional education, and individual and unit training."¹⁵

To accomplish the tasks outlined in the CSA's vision, the Army must be able to operate across this full spectrum environment, as outlined in FM 100-5. FM 100-5 explains that war is tough, uncompromising, and unforgiving. Disciplined operations begin with trained leaders who create well-disciplined units and effectively conduct operations on the battlefield.¹⁶ Disciplined units are critical to the success of full spectrum operations. Chapter 14, FM 100-5 discusses the environment of combat. The sub-paragraph "The Psychological Perspective" outlines the challenges on the modern battlefield--noting the distance between soldiers, threats from chemical and biological weapons, and soldiers' loneliness and fear. According to doctrine, effective training, unit cohesion, and strong leadership can overcome these

challenges. Further, FM 22-102 provides direction on creating an effective, combat-ready soldier team.¹⁷ Without doubt, Army doctrine repeatedly stresses the need for disciplined, cohesive units to carry out military missions.

The success of full spectrum operations as envisioned by the CSA will depend on the Army's ability to field cohesive tactical units. Ardent du Picq, a nineteenth-century French cavalry officer and military theorist, wrote that cohesion is "the ultimate confidence, firm, and conscious, which does not forget itself in the heat of action and which alone makes true combatants." According to Richard A. Gabriel, "Unit cohesion is the presence of a set of conditions which create the expectations that a military unit will attempt to perform its assigned orders and missions irrespective of the situation and attendant risks."¹⁸ Anthony Kellet identifies compatibility, turbulence, competition, size, anxiety, leadership, and discipline as some of the elements of cohesion.¹⁹

S.L.A. Marshal stresses the need for compatibility: "I hold it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapon is the near presence or the presumed presence of a comrade. The warmth which derives from human companionship is as essential to his employment of the arms with which he fights as is the finger with which he pulls a trigger or the eye with which he aligns his sights."²⁰

The CSA considers current turbulence as a critical issue; it is severe enough that he has tasked the U.S. Army War College to study it. Turbulence is not merely a garrison problem. It has a profound effect on unit cohesion for deployed units. William Darryl Henderson claims that, "Cohesion is promoted the longer the soldier anticipates remaining in his unit. The greater the frequency of association in pursuit of common purpose, the greater the cohesion."²¹

Marshall advocates the role of competition in building cohesion: "Participation in sport may help turn a mild bookkeeper into a warrior if it has conditioned his mind so that he relishes the contest. The act of teaching one man to participate with other men in any training endeavor is frequently the first step in the development of new traits of receptiveness and outward giving in his character."²² Competition fosters the environment that will create a team or unit.

The ideal size of unit is debatable. Logic would dictate that perhaps the brigade is the ideal size force that can function cohesively in accordance with the CSA's vision of a strategically responsive force. Whether that is attainable is yet to be determined. According to Marshall, "Squad unity comes to full cooperation between each man and his neighbor. There is no battle strength within the company or regiment except as it derives from this basic element within the smallest component."²³ Despite the problem of how large a unit can function cohesively, there is little doubt that cohesion begins within the smallest units and builds upward.

The stress and anxiety experienced by units attempting to meet the requirements of "the full spectrum of operations" will be determined in time. Marshall observed that, "On the field of fire it is the

touch of human nature which gives men courage and enables them to make proper use of their weapons.”²⁴ Cohesion replaces a counterproductive anxiety of death with an anxiety conducive to fighting, and behaving honorably.²⁵

A critical element in everything we do from garrison operations to peacekeeping to open conflict is leadership, which will always be key. Kellet asserts that, “Well-trained and experienced officers and senior noncommissioned officers confer a sense of protection on their subordinates by virtue of their military skills; wasteful leadership and high casualties erode subordinates’ sense of well-being. Thus effective combat leadership has to temper accomplishment of the unit’s mission with concern for the integrity and well-being of the group.”²⁶ In effect, good leaders create cohesive units. Without effective leadership, units will not cohere.

A lack of discipline destroys cohesion. S.L.A. Marshall notes the fundamental importance of discipline: “Insofar as his ability to mold the character of troops is concerned, the qualifying test of an officer is judgment placed upon his soldierly abilities by those who serve under him. If they do not deem him fit for command, he cannot train them to obey. Thus when slackness is tolerated in officership, it is a direct invitation to disobedience, and as disobedience multiplies, all disappears.”²⁷ Our Officer and Non-commissioned Officer (NCO) leadership must be instilled deeply within units. Military leaders, unlike school principals, must not be perceived by subordinates as mere authority figures who will be summoned in times of crisis. In cohesive units, leadership is a felt presence, not a remote threat. In combat, unit cohesion is critical to effective operations. Consider the performance of two battalions early in the Vietnam War during a bloody engagement with a superior force of North Vietnamese regulars. Unit cohesion contributed to the success of the 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry on landing zone (LZ) X-Ray in November 1965. During the 14 months prior to deployment, the battalion had spent most of the time in the field. The unit practiced helicopter assault landings, coordination of artillery, tactical air support, aerial rocket artillery and flow of helicopters in and out of landing zones. The commander emphasized and practiced succession of command. Every soldier, down to the lowest private, was capable of taking over the job of the man above. The same was not true for 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry’s sister battalion, the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry. Neither was the outcome. The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry did not have the same intense training.²⁸ The battalion sergeant major said, “We got a lot of replacements in, filled up our battalion, prior to joining the cavalry. Airmobile training? We had precisely one ride at Ft Benning and that was our airmobile training. No more than two percent of the whole battalion had any combat experience. Frightening to think of. We were definitely new and not trained as a unit in airmobile operations.”²⁹ The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry walked into an ambush on LZ Albany only six miles from LZ X-Ray. This unfortunate unit suffered at least 60% casualties.³⁰

Major General Richard A. Cody, the Army’s Director of Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, after conducting a critical review of Task Force Hawk in Kosovo, now advocates that Army aviators deploy

as full battalions. The practice has been to deploy some of the aircraft (as requested by the CINC) and leave the others at home. Not only does this put a burden on the deploying forces because of the high OPTEMPO, but it also impairs the unit at home that has been deprived of equipment and personnel.³¹ But this is not only a problem in aviation, it is a problem in all units. Partial and individual deployments affect unit cohesion.

The Department of the Army staff has assigned within DCSOPS a Director of Force Programs. The mission of that directorate is to "Develop and maintain Total Force Planning guidance and detailed Active and Reserve Component force structure through Total Army Analysis, Force Accounting, Force Documentation and other force management forums."³² To assist in rapidly deploying the right size and capability of force, the Army has "modularized" modified tables of organization and equipment (MTOE) units at echelons above division level. Internal organizational capabilities are grouped to accomplish specific tasks. Citing these capabilities within paragraphs of a MTOE mission order facilitates effective packaging of Army forces for a small-scale contingency (SSC) operation. These pre-packaged modules replicate, increment, or vary functional capabilities of the parent unit. They facilitate "task organizing" and enable the supported CINC to design a force that is interchangeable, expandable, and tailorable to meet changing missions and needs.³³ But the Army is not using this means to provide forces to the CINCs. Instead, the Army and the CINCs choose to fill their ranks with individual augmentees. The Army has sacrificed the consistency and stability that are crucial to unit cohesion. It is difficult to understand how the continuous replacement of individuals into complex interpersonal units where survival requires cooperation, confidence in other members, and teamwork can produce a quality fighting organization. This reliance on individual augmentees calls into question the Army's ability to meet the CSA Vision to have a "strategically responsive force" (one brigade in 96 hours, one division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days). CINCs need to re-think their on-going use of individual augmentees.

THE INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION PROCESS: THE PROBLEM

The process appears to be very simple and clear cut, supported by regulation. The National Command Authorities (NCA) assign a supported combatant command a mission and identify supporting combatant commands, Services, and Defense agencies through the Unified Command Plan (UCP), Department of Defense (DOD) directives, and Execute Order/Deployment Order (EXORD/DEPORD). The supported combatant commander determines and validates force requirements for a specific mission. The combatant commander exercises command authority over assigned forces. The CINC will then determine, validate, and manage the individual augmentees. He is the joint force provider; he determines the rotation and tour length for his operations. His final responsibility is to task the Army component command for individual augmentees to round out his force and to provide for timely rotation of personnel during sustained operations.

The intent of this policy was to provide the combatant commands maximum flexibility to accomplish the mission. However, the first flaw in the process is the authority of the combatant command to "determine and validate its own force requirements." Admittedly, the commands then have the "incumbent responsibility to ensure requirements are validated by a competent and knowledgeable authority within the chain of command." But who on the CINC's staff is going to volunteer to disagree with the CINC, Deputy CINC or the Operations Directorate (J3)? We are not far from the problem of "the fox in the hen house."

Next, the CINC (Joint Command) tasks his subordinate Army component for personnel. The service component will fill or identify the shortfall to HQDA. HQDA will then review the requirement for "validity" and task a major command (MACOM) or identifies (IDs) an Agency. But the HQDA "validity" check is superfluous because "the supported combatant commander has an incumbent responsibility to ensure requirements are validated by a competent and knowledgeable authority within the chain of command." The requirements are not reviewed by the Joint Staff (they are notified) and are passed directly to HQDA and on to U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) or another MACOM. This tasking also bypasses Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). In accordance with (IAW) Title 10, USC, Section 155 the Joint Staff cannot directly task a service component.

The Joint Staff will validate requests for "forces" identified in Unified Command Plan (UCP), DOD directives, and EXORD/DEPORD from or for a combatant command and then pass on the requirement to JFCOM. Then JFCOM can task FORSCOM because FORSCOM is the land component command for JFCOM, in accordance with Title 10, USC Section 161 ("Combatant Commands Organize and Employ Forces to Carry Out Assigned Missions") and Sections 3013, 5013, and 8013 ("Service Secretaries Fulfill CINC's Operational Requirements").

The irony of this process is that the commands have the authority to write tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) without regard to the current established MTOE and also have two means to acquire forces. First, they can process the request through JCS and get "forces" validated. Then it is tasked through joint channels. The combatant commands can then task their subordinate services headquarters for additional forces on an individual augmentees piecemeal basis. Commanders responding to any of the following contingencies can and do task supporting Army components for individual augmentees.

This problem has become more acute as the number of contingency operations has increased over the last decade. The UN Security Council approved the creation of only 13 peacekeeping operations between 1948 and 1978 and none at all from 1979 to 1987. Then the Security Council established 38 peace operations between 1988 and 1999. That is nearly three times as many as in the previous 40 years.³⁴ Individual augmentee requirements originate from a wide spectrum of operations that range from disaster relief to regional conflict. The three different categories of contingencies further exacerbate individual tasking problems. Commanders responding to any of the following contingencies can and do task supporting Army components for individual replacements:

EMERGENCY CONTINGENCY--operational requirements, short noticed (received at HQDA with latest arrival date (LAD) less than 100 days, filled immediately); validated by the CINC; examples are Hurricane Mitch, Operation Desert Thunder;

MATURE CONTINGENCY--operational requirements, long term, recurring requirements, validated by CINC; examples are Operation Joint Forge, JTF-B;

EXERCISE--JCS exercises; generally more than 120 days notice of requirements; validated by CINC, examples are Ulchi Focus Lens, Foal Eagle.

Headquarters Department of the Army or the Service Headquarters' responsibility in this process is to provide personnel support to the forces as necessary and determine the level of personnel in the Army Component Commands. They are tasked to manage the individual augmentee requirements, to include sourcing, accountability, establishing sourcing criteria, and managing battle staff rosters. Likewise they manage the training, deployment, employment, redeployment and demobilization of individual non-related personnel (NRP). Finally they establish a CONUS replacement center (CRC) and individual deployment site [IDS] as required).

The lack of established individual augmentation procedural guidance has resulted in ad hoc management of individual augmentee requirements.³⁵ The reality is we have limited personnel. That translates to limited resources. Problems with the current system are that it offers only a stovepipe-limited visibility of requirements, assets, and status of deploying individuals. There is no connectivity, so each entity operates autonomously, "one man deep." This system also lacks standardized procedures, and is carried out through ad hoc operations within theaters and affords only limited analysis. It is a static system.

Currently there is no system in place at HQDA or a single agency that tracks the total number of individual augmentees (Active Component [AC], Reserve Component [RC], Civilian [CIV]) deployed throughout the world. There is no coordinated visibility of global requirements, no procedural guidance for management, and no way of resolving competing demands for the same grades and skills. Accuracy of theater accountability is degraded when deployment/redeployment procedures are not followed. Some data are available to account for the numbers that are deployed to the Bosnia/Kosovo region. This problem has been identified and action to correct this problem is underway. A decision brief to the Director of Operations, Readiness, and Mobilization was given on 23 September 1999. The Director allocated funds for the development of a Worldwide Individual Augmentee System (WAIS).

Needless to say, the current individual augmentee tasking system poses some perplexing problems. Currently, DAMO-FDF tasks MACOMs for personnel based strictly on which unit is in the "best position" to support the requirement. The "best position" to support is based solely on percentage fill of soldiers with that particular military occupational specialty (MOS). There is no consideration given to what the MACOM has already been previously tasked or for other requirements. For instance, the MACOM may have on-going Force Modernization, United States Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

testing, Division Ready Brigade (DRB), Intrinsic Action, JCS exercises, National Training Center (NTC) rotations, Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) or a myriad of other taskings. All of these taskings eventually manifest themselves in the Corps. In conjunction with its subordinate units, the Corps must then figure out how to meet the requirements of all these stovepipe organizations. Such examples reveal only the tip of the iceberg. We have not even noted day-to-day garrison requirements to keep the posts functioning.

Tasking under-manned units to deploy leads to tremendous chaos throughout the Army. After-action reports dating back to Task Force Eagle, 28 December 1995-10 November 1996, highlighted this problem. The 1st Armored Division (AD) had to TCS and attach numerous personnel to man its deploying units at adequate strength. When personnel are temporarily attached to deploying units, there is a disruption in their home unit and a significant training requirement in the deploying unit. This practice disrupts previously formed cohesive units and clearly affects the ability of other units to deploy. Organizational structures, designed for conventional mid-to high-level intensity operations, require augmentations to perform peacekeeping operations. Whenever possible, MTO&E units should be provided to maintain unit cohesion. Reduced manning levels below MTO&E exacerbate the problem of augmentation beyond acceptable levels of disruption in individual units. During mid-1967, infantry battalions serving in South Vietnam increased from three to four companies, with each company receiving a trained company packet from the United States. Instead of keeping the company packet together, the battalions reorganized, divided the packet into four groups and assigned each group to a rifle company. The fourth company received experienced individuals from the other three companies to bring the unit up to assigned strength. So much for unit cohesion.³⁶

From 17 August 1998 until 4 November 1999 in support of Operation Joint Guard, the CRC has processed 8,361 replacements for deployment and has redeployed 7,347 for a total 15,708. Also, deployment and redeployment operations are conducted simultaneously.³⁷ Because the HQDA tracking system is not fully operational, a breakout by grade, AC or RC, and MOS is not available. It would be safe to say that there are a significant number of soldiers not performing their duties as a part of cohesive team. Some may argue that these are not significant numbers in the overall "big scheme." The reality is that you have one soldier deployed, one preparing to go, and one that has just returned.

Our current method of determining the Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) likewise needs to be revised or eliminated. In today's environment, this method of determining priorities is archaic. The DAMPL provides the standing order of precedence list approved to guide the distribution of personnel and equipment resources used or controlled by the Department of the Army. The DAMPL supports military strategies and prioritizes units based on OPTEMPO in operations other than war and/or small-scale contingencies for which there are no operation plans (OPLAN) or concept plans (CONPLAN). The concept of keeping some units at high readiness and others at a lowered readiness does not work.

The Army is no longer large enough to maintain less-than-deployable units if it is to be a force-projection Army.

One of General Shinseki's primary goals is to improve the Army's strategic mobility. His goal is to deploy a brigade combat team anywhere in 96 hours. A division would be deployable in 120 hours, five divisions would deploy within 30 days. To succeed in meeting those standards, the Army must incorporate the CSA's guidance, meet the Title 10 mandates, and deal with the other factors that will ultimately affect stabilizing soldiers in cohesive units capable of deploying across the spectrum of situations from low-intensity to high-intensity conflict.

The Army Personnel managers use this guidance to fill units IAW the Personnel Priority Group. The current Personnel Priority Group (PPG) is the following:

<u>PPG1-3</u>	<u>PPG4&5</u>	<u>PPG6-8</u>
Joint (1)	25ID (4)	AC/RC (6)
Defense (1)	HQ XVIII Corps (4)	MTMC (6)
SOCOM (1)	USAREC (4)	Safety Center (6)
SDC (1)	2ACR, 1AD (4)	Functional CMDS
75 th RGR (1)	EUSA (4)	CID (6)
USMA (2)	INSCOM (4)	AMC (6)
SF GRPS (2)	USARPAC (5)	ACE (6)
CGSC, CTCs (3)	FOAS (5)	TRADOC SCHOOLS (6)
101 st , 82d (3)	HQ I, III, V CORPS (5)	ROTC (8)
1CAV, 3d ACR (3)		

This has changed with the CSA's new guidance to fill the TO&E divisions and ACR's. All this system does is add confusion to an already confusing personnel system. The quicker it is abandoned the better.

THE LAW

Other factors that influence the end strength of the line units are outside the CSA's control. Some of these are congressionally mandated. Title X, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, provides the Joint billets. Title XII, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, authorizes the Army Acquisition Corps. Title VII mandates 2000 active soldiers to AC/RC positions, while Title XI, the National Defense Authorization Act of FY94, requires the Army to provide AC advisors to RC units to improve readiness in the Reserves. In FY94, the Army strength was 538,000; 5,000 officers and enlisted were mandated by Congress to support the RC. The Secretary of the Army may modify or expand the program, but must report to Congress annually on the fill and promotion rates. The Army goal was to have 100 percent of those billets filled by September 1999. A significant deterrent to filling that goal was a failure to meet the FY99 Army end strength goal of 480,000. The Army's year-end strength was 478,500--a shortfall of 1,500 soldiers.

The AC/RC officer authorization is:

Captain	ODP	1046	Auth	1057
Major	ODP	473	Auth	481
Lieutenant Colonel	ODP	181	Auth	175
TOTAL	ODP	1700	Auth	1713 ³⁸

A heavy division is authorized 668 officers in the grades of captain, major, and lieutenant colonel. A light division is only authorized 594 captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. The AC/RC officer authorization is equivalent to almost three divisions of captains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. According to Personnel Priority Group (PPG) guidance, the RC is a PPG 6, but currently is close to 100 percent fill while other units with higher priorities are significantly less. This is reason for eliminating the DAMPL. It just adds confusion to an already confusing personnel system.

In the autumn of 1964, General Abrams described the impact of the requirements for advisors to the South Vietnamese. In Vietnam, we had the equivalent of nearly three and a half divisions of captains and majors, about three and a half divisions worth of lieutenants, and about three and a half divisions of master sergeants. There was no provision in the Army's manning for those requirements, and there is none now. The soldiers had to be taken out of existing units, leaving the leadership tasks there to be picked up by those who had been followers.³⁹ The Army totaled 965,000 and was building fast during this period. The U.S. Army on 1 October 1999 was only 479,400 and trying to hold on. We are not sending advisors in Vietnam, but the AC/RC requirements are equally paralyzing.

Another significant draw on the Force Structure is the Title X, Goldwater-Nichols Act, which congressionally mandates Joint and Defense Duty. A total of 10,751 soldiers are committed to this requirement. All of these soldiers are top quality individuals. The Army cannot provide this many leaders to these billets and be expected as well to meet the CSA's guidance to deploy five divisions in 30 days with cohesive units.

In addition to the above-mentioned drain on personnel, there are other "by law" requirements, "expected by policy" requirements that have led to our current system of individual augmentation in the formation of task forces for operations other than war. All of these requirements for personnel produce units that lack the basic requirements under our doctrine to be cohesive combat units. Equally as challenging is General Wesley K. Clark's suggestion that TF Hawk will be the force of the future. If this is the case, a significant paradigm shift must take place. Units must be manned to 100 percent as General Shinseki envisions, and they must be ready to deploy in their entirety, whether they be a squad, a platoon, a company, or a battalion. It will truly be a come-as-you-are deployment. The "unit" must be a unit in the true sense of the word--and not just a group of individual augmentees.

The CSA has issued guidance to fill the ten divisions and two ACRs to 100 percent MOS authorizations by early 2001.⁴⁰ This will be a great step toward filling the units, but will do little to improve

overall readiness except on paper. It will still be a shell game. Deployments to Bosnia have historically leveraged Corps assets to flesh out some of the non-standard TDA organizations being developed by the CINCs. If the divisions are, in fact, filled at the expense of the Corps Headquarters and Corps units, then individual augmentation requirements will have to go to the divisions, because the Corps will no longer have a cushion of extra personnel to support these taskings. As long as the Army fills JCS tasks with individual augmentees rather than complete units, we will have a hard time maintaining combat-ready units simply because it destroys esprit and unit cohesion. The units that are being tasked are hurt, and the receiving units are being similarly penalized.

CONCLUSION

The Army of 1999 shows much in common with the Armies of 1950 and 1964. The similarities between the three periods are quite remarkable. Perhaps we are witnessing the natural cycle of change within the Army. "Plus ca change, plus c'est la même chose," According to Rene Descartes, "The more things change, the more they stay the same." By 1999, we had reduced the size of our divisions, reduced the number of companies from four to three in our battalions, and reduced the number of guns in each artillery gun battery from eight to six in attempting to lighten our forces. Now we are now modernizing our weapons. These were some of the same issues that challenged the Army of 1950.

Like the Army of 1964, we have begun a major transformation and are attempting to identify the morale problem currently affecting today's Army. Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a slowing down in the OPTEMPO coming any time soon. The CSA has tasked the U.S. Army War College to study the readiness issue and report back. This report was briefed to the CSA in January 2000; its release is pending. In Vietnam, we dedicated the equivalent of nearly three and a half divisions' worth of captains, majors, lieutenants, and master sergeants to an advisory force. There was no provision in the Army's manning for these requirements. Today the Army is still plagued with requirements for which the structure offers no authorizations.

The present day Army shows frightening similarities to both the Armies of 1950 and 1965. We are truly at a crossroads where the hard decisions must be made. General Shinseki has already made some of the tough calls at the strategic level, but there are still significant issues below the surface that will inhibit the complete transformation of the Army. The most significant issue is the policy of using individual augmentees rather than task forces of congruous units. From 17 August 1998 to 4 November 1999, the CRC processed 8,361 individual replacements for deployment and has redeployed 7,347 for a total of 15,708 individual augmentees in support of Operation Joint Guard. This should be an indication that we are not doing a very good job identifying unit requirements and are consequently breaking up units by sending individuals to accomplish the mission. Keep in mind that these numbers only indicate the soldiers that are deployed and redeployed. If the total included the number of soldiers preparing for deployment, it would more accurately reflect the on-going turbulence in the affected units.

As the Army begins its transformation to a lighter and more strategically mobile force, there will be some exciting times. The Army will be expected to meet its responsibility to provide forces for two major theater wars. This will take everything the active forces have available. It will require all 32 of the active Army's combat brigades and armored cavalry regiments, each and every one of them slotted for a major theater war (MTW).

We will not have the resources for standing down an "experimental unit" or for unit conversion, as we have in the past. There will be little or no time for stand down after peacekeeping deployments, as in Bosnia or Kosovo. Units must therefore be deployed and redeployed as units in order to minimize the time necessary to retrain them for their wartime mission. We no longer have the luxury of TCSing, passing back shortfalls, and expecting someone to fill the ranks. This practice not only hurts unit cohesion in the gaining unit, but also affects training in the losing unit. We must go back to issuing mission-type orders to division commanders and allowing them to meet the missions with their assigned unit forces. We cannot continue to bleed off leadership personnel to build ad hoc organizations if we are to meet the CSA's guidance of deploying one brigade in 96 hours, one division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. Units must be deployed as units in the agreed minimum unit package. The Army must deploy trained, cohesive fighting forces capable of dealing with the full spectrum of operations. Units must be able to deploy on short notice, to have the capability to inject themselves into permissive low threat environments, to quickly extract themselves, and to be prepared to transition to open conflict.

Finally, we must educate our politicians and re-educate the theater CINC staffs in the new force structure and capabilities. A cohesive, disciplined, and well-led unit can best accomplish the full spectrum mission. Consider a basketball team transitioning from a zone defense, to a man-to-man defense, to a full court press. Each player must be a part of a cohesive team, ready for the next mission.

General Starry said it best:

The need to change will be ever with us. We may have analyzed the process, framed its essential parameters, and made some considerable progress toward arming ourselves with systemic mechanisms to permit change to take place. But that in no way ensures either that change will occur or that it will be an easy, orderly process.⁴¹

RECOMMENDATIONS

On 23 June 1999, the CSA clearly stated his intent: "Heavy forces must be more strategically deployable and more agile with a smaller logistical footprint, and light forces must be more lethal, survivable and tactically mobile. Achieving this paradigm will require innovative thinking about structure, modernization efforts and spending". A good starting place would be a review of current personnel policies, detailing how they are affecting the force.

The CSA's strategic response goals are deployment of one brigade in 96 hours, one division in 120 hours, and five divisions in 30 days. To do this, we must maintain the integrity of our units. To meet the CSA's intent; the Army needs to review individual augmentation policies and processes within the

Department of the Army, reconsidering the requirements for the current AC/RC commitment; review critical skills inventory and adjust acquisition plans; review CJCSI 1301.01A, Policy and Procedures to Assign Individuals to Meet Combat Mission-Related Temporary Duty Requirements, 30 October 1998; and educate the theater CINC staffs in the new force structure.

In the early 1960s General Abrams chided General Johnson, who was then the Chief of Staff. "I have not observed since I have been here any interest, concern or appreciation in the Army staff for the plight of company and battalion commanders, who must carry out what is prescribed here in the absence of resources that should have been provided from here."⁴² It would appear the current CSA is attempting to solve this problem. We owe him our support.

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⁶ Ibid., 181.

⁷ Ibid.

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⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid., 182.

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